// Author: Ian D. Hanley (DevSecOpsDad) | linkedin.com/in/ianhanley | devsecopsdad.com | devsecopsdadattack.com
// Detects Linux processes where argv[0] (the string the process picked as its name) doesn't match
// the actual binary that was executed. Catches processes wearing another process's name tag — a
// classic Linux masquerading move. Compares InitiatingProcessCommandLine's argv[0] against the
// resolved FileName.
// Source: KQL Detection of the Week: A Name Is a Claim, Not a Fact (2026-06-29) — https://devsecopsdadattack.com/2026-06-29-KQL-Detection-of-the-Week_-A-Name-Is-a-Claim_-Not-a-Fact/

let LegitPaths = datatable(ProcName: string, ExpectedPathPrefix: string)[
    "sshd", "/usr/sbin/",
    "cron", "/usr/sbin/",
    "systemd", "/lib/systemd/",
    "bash", "/bin/",
    "sh", "/bin/",
    "python", "/usr/bin/",
    "python3", "/usr/bin/",
    "perl", "/usr/bin/",
    "nginx", "/usr/sbin/",
    "apache2", "/usr/sbin/"
];
Syslog
| where Facility in ("kern", "daemon", "user", "authpriv") or ProcessName in (LegitPaths | project ProcName)
| where SyslogMessage has "exe="
| extend ExePath = extract(@'exe="([^"]+)"', 1, SyslogMessage)
| where isnotempty(ExePath)
| extend ExeBasename = tostring(split(ExePath, "/")[-1])
| join kind=inner LegitPaths on $left.ExeBasename == $right.ProcName
| where not(ExePath startswith ExpectedPathPrefix)
| where not(ExePath startswith "/usr/local/")
| where not(ExePath startswith "/snap/")
| where not(ExePath startswith "/opt/")
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, ProcessName, ExeBasename, ExePath, ExpectedPathPrefix, SyslogMessage
| order by TimeGenerated desc